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Abstract
This paper examines how strategic investment of capitalists affects the industry
location in a footloose capital model. We show that the home market effect is
robust but is moderated when capitalists strategically invest. That is, the industry
location is closer to dispersion when capitalists are strategic than when they are
atomic.
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1 Introduction
The footloose capital (FC) model of Martin and Rogers (1995) is a workhorse in New
Economic Geography (NEG).1 Due to its tractability, many fields such as international
trade, environmental economics and public economics apply the FC model. This model
assumes that capitalists take the capital reward as given, and invest all their capital into
the country with the highest reward. This paper discusses this assumption carefully at
least for two reasons. First, there is evidence that the capital market is concentrated.
Li et al. (2011), for example, report that large foreign shareholders stabilize the stock
return in emerging economies. And, Cetorelli et al. (2007) document that concentration
in most global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets is rising. Second, it is extreme
that capitalists invest their capital into only one country. Risk-averse capitalists diversify
portfolio.2
We examine the implication of the imperfectly competitive capital market for in-
dustry location. Concretely, we introduce strategic capitalists into the FC model with
homogeneous Cournot competition.3 We show that the home market effect is robust,
but moderated by the strategic investment. Our conclusion is that the imperfectly com-
petitive capital market does not qualitatively affect the key insight in the FC model,
but quantitatively affects it. In other words, the implication in the existing literature
continues to be useful even for the case of strategic investment.
This paper belongs to the literature that enriches NEG. Baldwin et al. (2003, pp.
286-294) consider the implication of costly capital movement for the price-lowering pro-
tection in the monopolistically competitive FC model. Behrens et al. (2009) examine
the implication of the oligopolistic transport industry for industry location in a footloose
entrepreneur model. Behrens et al. (2014) show that the results in the core-periphery
model survive imperfect competition in the numeraire good sector.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proves the main result. Section 3
concludes.
1See Baldwin et al. (2003).
2See, for example, Knill (2009) and Bartkus and Hassan (2009) for empirics.
3While NEG usually assumes a monopolistically competitive good market, Ludema and Wooton
(2000), Haufler and Wooton (2010) and Thisse (2010) use a homogeneous good Cournot model.
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2 Analysis
We extend Haufler and Wooton’s (2010) model. There are θL consumers in Home and
(1 − θ)L consumers in Foreign, where L is the mass of world consumers, and θ ∈ (0, 1)
is the population share of Home. Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor.
One unit of the numeraire good requires one unit of labor. Thus, the wage rate is fixed
to one in both countries. The non-numeraire good market is segmented, and exporting
incurs per-unit trade cost τ > 0. In Home (resp. Foreign), n (resp. n∗) identical firms
produce a homogeneous good, and supply to domestic and foreign consumers. Denote by
xi and x
∗
i (resp. yi and y
∗
i ) the supply of firm i in Home (resp. Foreign) into the Home


















, a > 0,
where p and p∗ are the good price in Home and Foreign, respectively.4
One unit of capital is needed to set up one firm. Let c be marginal labor requirement
and r (resp. r∗) be capital rental in Home (resp. Foreign). Then, firm i in Home (resp.
Foreign) chooses xi and x
∗
i (resp. yi and y
∗
i ) to maximize profit (p−c)xi+(p∗−c−τ)x∗i −r
(resp. (p− c− τ)yi + (p∗ − c)y∗i − r∗). The symmetric Cournot equilibrium outputs are
x =
(τn∗ + α)θL
n+ n∗ + 1
, y =
(−τn+ α− τ)θL
n+ n∗ + 1
, x∗ =
(−τn∗ + α− τ)(1− θ)L
n+ n∗ + 1
, y∗ =
(τn+ α)(1− θ)L
n+ n∗ + 1
.
(1)








(τn∗ + α)2θL+ (−τn∗ + α− τ)2(1− θ)L













(n+ n∗ + 1)2
. (3)
In the existing NEG, capitalists take capital rentals as given, and invest all their capital
into the country with the higher capital reward. Instead, we assume strategic investment
4This inverse demand function is derived from the individual utility function u = aq − q2/2 + q0,
where u is utility, q is consumption of the non-numeraire good, and q0 is consumption of the numeraire
good.
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as follows. A third country has a capital endowment K and m identical capitalists, each
owning K/m amount of capital. Denoting the investment by capitalist j into Home and
Foreign by kj and k
∗
j , respectively, it holds that kj + k
∗








and n + n∗ = K. Capitalist j determines the investment levels by taking into account
(2), (3) and these equalities. Then, capitalist j’s problem and the resulting first-order






















The system of the first-order conditions yields the symmetric Nash equilibrium in-
vestment:
k =
2(2θ − 1)[m(K + 1)−K]α + {m(K + 1)2 − 2θ[m(K + 1)−K]} τ
2m[(m+ 1)(K + 1)−K]τ
.
Therefore, the share of Home firms λ ≡ n/K = mk/K is
λ =
2(2θ − 1)[m(K + 1)−K]α + {m(K + 1)2 − 2θ[m(K + 1)−K]} τ
2K[(m+ 1)(K + 1)−K]τ
. (5)
From (5), we have the main result.
Proposition. When the capital market is imperfectly competitive, the home market effect
is moderated and the industry location is more dispersed.
Proof. Assume θ > 1/2. Contracting θ from λ in (5), we have
λ− θ = (2θ − 1){2[m(K + 1)−K]α−m(K + 1)
2τ}
2K[(m+ 1)K + 1)−K]τ
> 0,
which confirms the home market effect: the share of Home firms is larger than the share
of Home consumers.




(2θ − 1)(2α− τ)(K + 1)2
2τk[(m+ 1)(K + 1)−K]
> 0.
5The second-order condition is satisfied because the objective function is strictly concave in kj .
4
Hence, as the capital market is more imperfectly competitive (m falls), λ decreases. The
same observation applies to the case of θ < 1/2 by reversing the above argument. Hence,
we reach Proposition. ||
Figure 1 illustrates this result when θ > 1/2. The locus gives the right-hand side of
(4).6 The spatial equilibrium is point E at which λ > θ > 1/2 holds. As capitalists have
market power (m falls), this locus shifts downward, and hence the spatial equilibrium
value of λ falls.
(Figure 1 here)
The intuition behind Proposition is similar to the Cournot oligopoly model and as
follows. Suppose that capitalist j raises kj unilaterally. Then, she marginally increases
revenue by r, but decreases revenue by (∂r/∂kj)kj. In other words, marginal revenue of
investment decreases as capitalists have stronger market power. Therefore, each capitalist
invests less when the capital market is imperfectly competitive than it is perfectly com-
petitive. This is why strategic investment moderates the home market effect. However,
we stress that the insight from the existing FC model is still useful: firms agglomerate
into the country with the large share of consumers more than proportionally.
3 Conclusion
In order to incorporate evidence that the capital market is concentrated, we have explored
the implication of strategic investment in an FC model of NEG. We demonstrate that
market power of capitalists moderates the home market effect although it still holds. That
is, the agglomeration pattern qualitatively is the same both in perfectly and imperfectly
competitive capital markets. We finally note that this result rests on the assumption of
costless investment. It is worth reconsidering our result by incorporating costly invest-
ment as Baldwin et al. (2003) adress.
6The locus is negatively-sloped because the capitalist’s objective function is strictly concave in kj .
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Figure 1: Effect of strategic investment on location (θ > 1/2)
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